{"country":{"country_code":"IR","incidents_365d":7,"leads":[{"corr":0.6695,"country":"MM","lag_days":1,"p_adj":0.0},{"corr":0.6077,"country":"KZ","lag_days":25,"p_adj":0.0},{"corr":0.6,"country":"RU","lag_days":1,"p_adj":0.0},{"corr":0.5973,"country":"TH","lag_days":21,"p_adj":0.0},{"corr":0.5973,"country":"SA","lag_days":21,"p_adj":0.0}],"led_by":[{"corr":0.7325,"country":"MA","lag_days":15,"p_adj":0.0}]},"generated_at":"2026-05-21T12:55:40.096762+00:00","honest_caveat":"Cross-correlation does NOT imply causation. Significant lead/lag pairs may reflect (a) one country influencing another, (b) shared regional or geopolitical drivers (elections, sanctions, fiber routes), or (c) downstream measurement effects from overlapping ISP infrastructure. lag=0 (simultaneous) is intentionally excluded -- see /atlas/correlation-matrix for that case. With 50 countries and 31 lags evaluated per pair, the raw p-values overstate significance; we apply Benjamini-Hochberg FDR control at alpha=0.05 and require |r| >= 0.4. Counts come from the citable-censorship subset (incident_type IN censorship/mixed) -- IODA disruption rows are excluded since they include fiber cuts / weather / DDoS.","method":"pearson-cross-correlation-bh-fdr","version":"v1"}